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RECONSIDERING THORNTON V. CALDOR
CHRISTOPHER C. LUND*
[P]eopleperceive a religious accommodationcase like [Thornton v.
Caldor] in many different ways: as a case about government intrusion
on employer liberty; as a case about religious observance; as a case
about government empowerment of religion; as a case about
equalizing employment opportunities; as a case about unequal
treatment of religious and non-religious workers. These multiple
perspectives explain why people disagree about religious
accommodation issues, and may also explain why people often feel
some division within themselves.
Respondent's Briefin Thornton v. Caldorl
Thirty-five years ago, the United States Supreme Court decided Estate
of Thornton v. Caldor.2 Caldor struck down, on Establishment Clause
grounds, a Connecticut statute giving employees the right not to work on
their chosen Sabbath. Caldorwas the first Supreme Court case to impose
constitutional limits on religious exemptions, 3 and is constantly invoked and
debated in modern disputes over free exercise.4 Yet Caldor also contains
curiosities and mysteries. The Court's opinion is short, its holding unclear,
and its reasoning somewhat incomplete.
This short symposium piece takes a look back at Thornton v. Caldor,
seeking to offer a clearer discussion of this famously muddy case. Placing

*
Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. Thanks to Jessie Hill for formative
early conversations on the subject, to Elizabeth Katz and Marc DeGirolami for thoughtful intrapanel
discussion at the symposium, to Stephanie Barclay, Carl Esbeck, Chad Flanders, Charlotte Garden,
Michael Helfand, Doug Laycock, William Ortman, Mark Storslee, Nelson Tebbe, and Jon Weinberg for
comments on earlier drafts, and to Zachary Drabczyk for excellent research assistance.

1.
Brief for Caldor, Inc. at 24-25, Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985) (No.
83-1158), 1984 WL 566033, at *24-25.
2.
472 U.S. 703 (1985).
3.
To be sure, Caldor was not the first case to consider the Establishment Clause's application
to religious exemptions. There were earlier ones, like Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971),

Walz v. Tax Commission ofNew York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970); Welsh v. UnitedStates, 398 U.S. 333 (1970),
and United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965). But none of those cases held a religious exemption
unconstitutional. Gillette upheld a religious exemption against a claim of denominational discrimination;
Walz upheld a tax exemption for religious property; and Welsh and Seeger both interpreted a religious
exemption broadly to ameliorate Establishment Clause concerns.
4.
For some good recent pieces discussing Caldor and its legacy, see Stephanie H. Barclay,
First Amendment "Harms," 95 IND. L.J. 331 (2020); Carl H. Esbeck, Do DiscretionaryReligious
Exemptions Violate the Establishment Clause?, 106 KY. L.J. 603 (2017); Micah Schwartzman, Nelson

Tebbe & Richard Schragger, The Costs of Conscience, 106 KY. L.J. 781 (2017).
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the case in historical context, it takes a deeper dive into the Court's
decision-scrutinizing what the Court said and reflecting on what it left out.

Thornton v. Caldor arises out of changes in Connecticut's Sundayclosing laws.' Caldor itself mentions this backstory in a footnote, but it
helps with understanding various facets of the case. The Supreme Court had
upheld Sunday-closing laws from Establishment Clause challenges in a set
of older cases, the most famous of which is probably McGowan v.
Maryland.6 Yet the arc of history was bent against Sunday-closing laws, and
their story in both Connecticut and other places is one of slow but steady
decline.
Connecticut's Sunday-closing laws dated all the way back to 1650, and
Connecticut would retain some form of Sunday-closing law until the state
dropped its ban on Sunday alcohol sales in 2012.8 As originally conceived,
these laws were simply legal instantiations of religious requirements. The
Commandments given to Moses had instructed the faithful to remember the
Sabbath day and keep it holy: "Six days you shall labor, and do all your
work, but the seventh day is a Sabbath to the Lord your God." 9 Even so,
changes in American society had brought changes to Sunday-closing laws.
Their rationales were being reconceived along more secular lines, and their
scopes were becoming increasingly narrow, as consumers and businesses
saw Sunday in terms more commercial and less religious.' 0 Here one thinks
naturally of another Burger opinion from the previous year, Lynch v.
Donnelly, where another traditional aspect of religious observance (a

Caldor, 472 U.S. at 705 n.2.
5.
366 U.S. 420 (1961); see also Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366
6.
U.S. 582 (1961); Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Mkt. of Mass., Inc., 366 U.S. 617 (1961); Braunfeld
v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
The historical evolution of Connecticut's Sunday-closing laws is well covered in an earlier
7.
Connecticut case that partially invalidated those laws. See Caldor's, Inc. v. Bedding Barn, Inc., 417 A.2d

343, 345-47 (Conn. 1979).
8.
See, e.g., Lidia Ryan, A Look at Some of Connecticut's Blue Laws, CONN. POST (Oct. 29,
2015, 1:40 PM), https://www.ctpost.com/living/article/A-look-at-some-of-Connecticut-s-Blue-Laws-

6598583.php [https://perma.cc/KWY7-PSYX].
Exodus 20:9-10. No one disputes this as a historical matter. See McGowan, 366 U.S. at 431
9.
("There is no dispute that the original laws which dealt with Sunday labor were motivated by religious
forces."); Two Guysfrom Harrison-Allentown, Inc., 366 U.S. at 592 (agreeing with the lower court that
"the connection between religion and the original Pennsylvania Sunday closing statutes was obvious and

indisputable").
10.
McGowan discusses the evolution of Sunday-closing laws both generally and in Maryland in
particular. See McGowan, 366 U.S. at 431-48. Another Supreme Court case discusses the evolution of
Pennsylvania's closing laws. See Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc., 366 U.S. at 592-97. Again,
for the history of Connecticut's closing law, see Caldor's, Inc., 417 A.2d at 345-47.
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nativity scene in celebration of Christmas) was reconceived along more
secular and commercial lines (and upheld on that basis)."
Thornton v. Caldor arose out of this background. By the late 1970s,
Connecticut's Sunday-closing laws were in a state of flux. The Connecticut
courts had repeatedly held the laws unconstitutionally vague, which had
prompted repeated interventions by the Connecticut legislature to fix the
problems.1 2 This had softened the Sunday-closing laws in a variety of
ways-most pertinent here, certain kinds of retail businesses were now free
to open on Sundays when they had been required to close before. In turn,
these changes prompted Connecticut's legislature to adopt the statute at
issue in Thornton v. Caldor:
No person who states that a particular day of the week is observed as
his Sabbath may be required by his employer to work on such day.
An employee's refusal to work on his Sabbath shall not constitute
grounds for his dismissal.13
The connection between the decline of the Sunday-closing laws and this
statute may be obvious, but it is worth saying explicitly. In the past, religious
employees in retail businesses who would have wanted to take Sunday off
for religious reasons were effectively shielded by Connecticut's Sundayclosing law. Those businesses could not operate on Sundays, so their
employees automatically got Sunday off. But now that Connecticut was
changing the rules to allow retail businesses to open on Sunday, Connecticut
had to face the fact that some employees would be conscripted to work on
Sundays, and that some of the conscripted would have religious objections
to that.

11.

See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); see also id at 727 (Blackmun, J.,

dissenting) ("The cr6che has been relegated to the role of a neutral harbinger of the holiday season,
useful for commercial purposes, but devoid of any inherent meaning and incapable of enhancing the
religious tenor of a display of which it is an integral part. . . . Surely, this is a misuse of a sacred
symbol."); Michael W. McConnell, Religious Participationin Public Programs-ReligiousFreedom at
a Crossroads,59 U. CH. L. REv. 115, 127 (1992) ("It would be better to forbid the government to have
religious symbols at all than to require that they be festooned with the trappings of modem American
materialism.").
One aside about the religious display in Lynch: The Supreme Court mentions that the cr6che was
accompanied by many other things-"a Santa Claus house, reindeer pulling Santa's sleigh, candystriped poles, a Christmas tree, carolers, cutout figures representing such characters as a clown, an
elephant, and a teddy bear, hundreds of colored lights, [and] a large banner that reads 'SEASONS
GREETINGS."' Lynch, 465 U.S. at 671. But the Supreme Court omits one critical fact-that the nativity

scene also included a robot. See Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1150, 1155 (D.R.I. 1981) (noting the
robot). For some reason, my students always find this amusing. Despite deep disagreements on what
happened two thousand years ago, everyone seems to agree that no robots were involved.

12.
See Caldor's,Inc., 417 A.2d at 345-47 (discussing the history).
13.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-303e(b) (West 1985), invalidated by Estate of Thornton v.
Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
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The legislative history of the statute captures these points well enough.
"Some people," Representative Webber said, "have expressed concern
about the employees who would staff the stores that choose to open on
Sundays." 1 4 To address that concern, Senator Hudson claimed that the
Connecticut statute "gives people the right not to work on the Sabbath if
they choose to and I think that that is a responsible action on the part of
government to guarantee those who wish to observe their Sabbath, whatever
day it is, not to have to work." 15
Note how Representative Webber spoke strictly in terms of Sundays,
while Senator Hudson spoke more generally. One striking aspect of the
statute has to do with denominational neutrality. The Connecticut statute
protecting workers was denominationally neutral. Each person could take
their chosen Sabbath off, whether it is Saturday, Sunday, or something else.
(Although, you will note, each person could claim only one Sabbath day
each week.) Yet, at the same time, obviously the Connecticut statute was
passed with Christians in mind. After all, for hundreds of years, Connecticut
had operated without any statute giving other workers the right to take their
Sabbaths off. Connecticut only did so now because the repeal of the Sundayclosing laws threatened Sunday-observing Christians. The statute itself was
denominationally neutral, but the concerns it was responding to were
specific concerns about the situation of Christians given the decline of the
Sunday-closing laws.
This leads to an interesting point about the interplay between free
exercise and disestablishment values. Generally free exercise and
disestablishment work hand-in-hand toward an attractive conception of
religious freedom. 16 But sometimes, as here, weird things can happen.
Forget McGowan v. Marylandfor a second, and take Sunday-closing laws
as part and parcel of a genuine religious establishment. (Certainly that is
how they started.)1 7 In this way, one can see how religious establishments
can partially and backhandedly serve free exercise values. For all those
years, Christians in Connecticut were vicariously protected from having to
work on Sunday by Connecticut's closing laws. This is not to defend closing
14.

19 CONN. H.R. PROCEEDINGS (pt. 6), at 2415 (Apr. 21, 1976) (remarks of Rep. Webber).

The legislative history of the bill is best covered in two briefs. See Brief for the United States as Amicus

Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 13-14, Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (No. 83-1158), 1984 WL 566038, at *1314; Brief of Intervenor State of Connecticut in Support of Reversal at app. C, Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (No.

83-1158), 1984 WL 566031.
19 CONN. S. PROCEEDINGS (pt. 5), at 2039-40 (Apr. 28, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Hudson).
15.
16.
I have put it this way: "The Free Exercise Clause gives people the right to practice their
religion, while the Establishment Clause denies the government the right to practice religion. By
requiring the government to stay out of religious affairs, the Constitution commits matters of religious
beliefand practice exclusively to the private sphere." Christopher C. Lund, In Defense ofthe Ministerial

Exception, 90 N.C. L. REv. 1, 12 (2011) (footnote omitted).
17.

See supra note 8.
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laws. Forcing everyone to observe the Christian Sabbath is a massively
overbroad way of protecting the Christians who would, on their own, choose
to observe it. It is like making everyone go to church as a way of ostensibly
protecting the right of those who would choose to go on their own.
In this way, though, we can see how the demise of religious
establishments naturally leads to questions about the propriety of targeted
free exercise in their place. No longer is this merely about Thornton v.
Caldor-wecan see it, for example, in the most pressing issues of religious
accommodation in our time. For a long time, Western society had an
exclusively heterosexual conception of marriage, a conception of marriage
that many Christians still hold. Maybe this is not a religious establishment
exactly, but that view still dominated from time inmemorial. Yet as this
conception of marriage has lost its preeminence in American society, hard
questions about free exercise necessarily follow. What rights should those
who held the formerly hegemonic view-say Kim Davis or Jack Phillipshave now that the hegemony has collapsed?" What rights should they have
as dissenters, the argument goes, when they tolerated so little dissent when
they held the power? One persistent claim in Thornton v. Caldoris that the
Connecticut statute at issue was merely a rear-guard action to maintain the
Christian Sabbath despite the collapse of Connecticut's Sunday-closing
laws-just as one persistent claim in Masterpiece Cakeshop is that the suit
was merely a rear-guard action to maintain the old heterosexual view of
marriage despite Obergefell.1 9
This brings us to Donald Thornton, the plaintiff in Thornton v. Caldor.2 0
Thornton was a department manager at the defendant Caldor, Incorporated,
a chain of New England retail stores. Thornton managed the mens' and
boys' clothing departments at a store in Waterbury. He had been hired in
1975, back when Connecticut's Sunday-closing laws forced Caldor's
Connecticut stores to close on Sunday. But in 1976, because of changes in
the closing laws, Caldor's stores began opening on Sundays and requiring
managers to work every third or fourth Sunday. Union employees did not
have to work on Sundays if they had religious objections, and were given
premium wages (time and a half) if they chose to work. But that was because

For those who do not know, Jack Phillips was the baker who refused to provide a cake for a
18.
gay wedding in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 138 S. Ct. 1719
(2018), and Kim Davis was the county clerk who refused to issue marriage licenses for gay couples in

Miller v. Davis, 123 F. Supp. 3d 924 (E.D. Ky. 2015).
19.
See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., 138 S. Ct. 1719; Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584
(2015).
20.

The facts in the next two paragraphs, which are uncontested, come from the parties' briefs.

See Brief for Petitioner at 2-7, Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985) (No. 83-1158),
1984 WL 566029, at *2-7, and Brief for Caldor, Inc. at 1-7, Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (No. 83-1158), 1984
WL 566033, at *1-7.

1692

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 97:1687

of the collective bargaining agreement negotiated by the union. Being a
manager, Thornton did not belong to the union-he had to work Sundays.
A devout Presbyterian, Thornton initially worked Sundays for Caldor in
1977 and 1978. But in 1979, after consulting an attorney and learning of the
statute, Thornton asked Caldor to be excused from Sunday work. Caldor
was willing to transfer Thornton to a Massachusetts store, which was closed
on Sundays (because of, you guessed it, Massachusetts's more old-school
Sunday-closing law). When Thornton refused, Caldor demoted him to a
rank-and-file employee position at about half the salary. Thornton quit and
brought suit in a state administrative forum-the State Board of Mediation
and Arbitration. Relying on the above statute, the Board found for Thornton,
and its judgment was confirmed by a Connecticut trial court.
But the Connecticut Supreme Court unanimously reversed, agreeing
with Caldor that the statute violated the Establishment Clause. 2 ' Like the
United States Supreme Court, the Connecticut Supreme Court handled the
case with the three-part framework of Lemon v. Kurtzman.22 But the
Connecticut opinion was more ambitious. It concluded that Connecticut's
statute violated all three prongs of Lemon, including Lemon's first
requirement of a secular purpose. Broad language in the opinion suggested
that religious exemptions were inherently defective, that they categorically
lacked secular purpose.2 3 It would be hard to write this kind of opinion
now-especially after Amos, where the Court began to explain how
24
religious exemptions could be justified in non-religious terms. No one
thinks the state favors the Native American Church by allowing them to use
peyote in their religious rituals.25 When the state allows a Brazilian group
to use hoasca in worship, no one takes that as a governmental endorsement
of hoasca, worship, or the specific religious tenets of that Brazilian group

21.

Caldor, Inc. v. Thornton, 464 A.2d 785 (Conn. 1983), affd, 472 U.S. 703 (1985).

403 U.S. 602 (1971). Lemon's three-part framework included the requirements of (1) a
22.
secular legislative purpose, (2) a principal or primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion,
and (3) no excessive entanglement with religion. Id. at 612-13.
Here is the heart of the Connecticut Supreme Court's secular-purpose analysis: "The
23.
unmistakable purpose of such a provision is to allow those persons who wish to worship on a particular
day the freedom to do so. We conclude that § 53-303e(b) does not pass the 'clear secular purpose' test
of establishment clause scrutiny." Caldor, 464 A.2d at 793.
24.
Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos,
483 U.S. 327, 334 (1987) ("There is ample room under the Establishment Clause for 'benevolent
neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference."'

(quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970))). It is true that Amos drew this
language from Walz v. Tax Commission ofNew York, 397 U.S. 664. But the language meant something
different in Amos than it had in Walz, because Amos involved a regulatory exemption while Walz had
involved a tax exemption. Importing this language into the regulatory-exemption context was a
conceptual evolution.

25.

See Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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(whatever they happen to be).26 The state promotes religion when it
promotes it. The state does not promote religion by allowing its exercise.
In any event, this brought Thornton v. Caldor to the United States
Supreme Court. There Thornton was represented by the National Jewish
Commission on Law and Public Affairs and the American Jewish Congress.
Here too there is a story. Thornton had actually died, and his estate did not
want to appeal. But the two groups received permission from Thornton's
executor to petition the Supreme Court to try and get the Connecticut
decision reversed.2 7 In hindsight, of course, this turned out to be a mistake;
it ended up making nationwide the precedent those groups were trying to
undo in Connecticut. But that was impossible to see at the time.
The briefs filed in the Court were lopsidedly in Thornton's favor. Civil
rights groups and religious organizations of all kinds saw themselves in
Thornton. The ACLU, Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, the American Jewish Committee, and the Anti-Defamation League
all wrote in support of Thornton as amici. 2 8 Nowadays, of course, groups
like the ACLU and Americans United argue for stringent Establishment
Clause limitations on religious exemptions, supporting Caldor and a broad
interpretation of it. But at the time, they opposed Caldor-Americans
United said that striking down the statute, as the Court eventually did, would
"make[] a mockery of one of the primary purposes of the religion clauses of
the First Amendment." 2 9
Insiders will not be surprised by this. It is part of the larger change that
has happened over the past few decades. As conservative religious belief
has clashed with civil rights laws, the right has become more solicitous of
free exercise while the left has become less. 3 0 The briefs in Thornton v.
Caldorthus remind us of the old world-back when civil rights groups saw
vividly, and in equality terms, the necessity of religious exemptions for
believers. 3 1 And not only did Thornton have the civil rights groups on his
26.

See Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006).

27.
These details are recounted in David Margolick, High Court Gets Connecticut Sabbath-Work
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1984, at C24, https://www.nytimes.com/1 984/04/1 1/nyregion/high-court-ge
ts-connecticut-sabbath-work-case.html [https://perma.cc/38FA-A9B8].
28.
See Brief of Americans United for Separation of Church and State as Amicus Curiae and
Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief at 12, Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703

(1985) (No. 83-1158), 1984 WL 566044, at *12.
29.

Id.; see also Michael A. Helfand, Jews and the Culture Wars: Consensus and Dissensus in

Jewish Religious Liberty Advocacy, 56 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 305, 332-33 (2019) (discussing differences
between the briefs submitted by different Jewish organizations).
30.
For a sustained treatment of how folks on the right have changed their minds, see James M.
Oleske, Jr., A Regrettable Invitation to "ConstitutionalResistance, " Renewed Confusion over Religious
Exemptions, and the Future ofFree Exercise, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 1317, 1346-55 (2017).
31.
The notion of equality frequently appears throughout these briefs, in statements like this:
"Sabbatarians can never achieve equality of employment opportunity so long as employers and unions
are permitted to exclude from employment those who cannot, because of conscience, work on their
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side, he had the Reagan Administration's Solicitor General on his side, as
well as the state of Connecticut-Joseph Lieberman, who would soon
become Connecticut's junior Senator, divided oral argument time with
Thornton's counsel.
Another striking thing is that it is not clear why the Supreme Court took
this case. The Connecticut Supreme Court's decision addressed one
particular Connecticut statute that had no ramifications outside the state.
There was no circuit split-and given the uniqueness of Connecticut's
statute, there was little chance one would develop soon. And the
Connecticut Supreme Court had struck down the statute unanimously.
Moreover, the Connecticut statute had almost no track record. The
United States Supreme Court would eventually strike it down on its face
(not as-applied), on the theory that it put too much of a burden on employers
and other employees. But there was little evidence on what those burdens
actually were. In its amicus brief, the ACLU argued that the case should be
dismissed as improvidently granted for this reason.32 Lower courts should
consider whether Thornton could be easily accommodated by his employer,
the ACLU said. Maybe the constitutional problem would go away and the
statute could be saved. Or maybe the Court would then have a basis for
distinguishing between unconstitutional applications of the statute (where
the burdens were too much) and constitutional ones (where they weren't).
But those obviously were not paths the Supreme Court took.
Modern readers are struck when they read Thornton v. Caldor for the
first time. Casebooks can easily include the whole decision. The main
opinion is only three pages long. Its legal analysis is a single page. Justice
Rehnquist dissents, but he does not write an opinion. It is not how the Court
would decide a case today. Thornton v. Caldoris fascinating in part because
the Court says so little.
Handling the case within Lemon's framework, the Court concludes that
Connecticut's statute fails Lemon's second prong-the requirement that
34
governmental action not have a primary effect of advancing religion. But
here the Court buries the lede. Thornton's principal argument was that
Lemon's framework should not apply to religious exemptions. 3 5 Thornton
Sabbath." Brief of Americans United for Separation of Church and State as Amicus Curiae and Motion

for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief at 7, Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (No. 83-1158), 1984 WL 566044, at
*7.
32.

See The American Civil Liberties Union and the American Jewish Committee for Leave to

File and Brief Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 20-27, Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (No. 83-1158),
1984 WL 566040, at *20-27.
Id.
33.
Caldor,472 U.S. at 710.
34.
See Brief for Petitioner at 10-27, Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (No. 83-1158), 1984 WL 566029, at
35.
*10-27; see also Michael D. Woerner, Recent Development, Thornton v. Caldor: Will the Supreme
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pointed out that it never had before, and Thornton insisted that a mechanistic
application of Lemon (one that took any protections for free exercise as
advancing religion) would lead only to "confusion and to absurd
consequences." 36 Also keep in mind that Marsh v. Chambers3 7 had been
decided only two years before Thornton v. Caldor. In Marsh, Chief Justice
Burger ignored Lemon-which was, you must remember, yet another
Burger opinion-in a context where it seemed obviously relevant,
presumably because doing so would have led to a conclusion that Burger
thought impossible.38 In that way, Caldor is a 180-degree turnabout from
Marsh. Now Chief Justice Burger finds Lemon suddenly relevant again, and
so obviously controlling that he does not feel the need to say anything about
it.
The Court's analysis boils down to its almost-visceral sense that the
Connecticut statute advances religion (in violation of Lemon's second
prong). The Court sees the statute as favoritism for religion. But it is hard
to put one's finger on exactly why the Court feels this way, because the
Court throws around a bunch of concerns without systematizing them, let
alone ranking them or choosing between them. The Court frequently returns
to how the statute operates categorically and indefeasibly: the statute "arms
Sabbath observers with an absolute and unqualified right not to work," and
imposes "an absolute duty [on businesses] to conform their business
practices to the particular religious practices of the employee." 39 "Sabbath
religious concerns automatically control over all secular interests at the
workplace," and "the statute takes no account of the convenience or
interests of the employer or those of other employees." 40
In particular, it is hard to figure out whether the Court is concerned more
about the burdens on employers (who have to accommodate people like
Thornton) or employees (who may end up practically bearing the brunt of
the accommodation). Modern folks often see Thornton v. Caldor as being
fundamentally about the rights of other employees. But the opinion does not
read that way. Instead, the Court persistently lumps together the concerns
of employers and employees-referring to the "burden or inconvenience
this imposes on the employer orfellow workers," and the "interests of the
employer or those of other employees." 1 In an excellent piece, Charlotte
CourtPut the Squeeze on Lemon?, 12 J. LEGIS. 96, 101 (1985) ("Thornton's central argument [is] that
the Court should not apply the Lemon test to the facts of this case.").

36.
37.

See Brief for Petitioner at 23, Caldor,472 U.S. 703 (No. 83-1158), 1984 WL 566029, at *23.
463 U.S. 783 (1983).

38.
See Christopher C. Lund, Legislative Prayerand the Secret Costs ofReligious Endorsements,
94 MINN. L. REv. 972, 984 (2010) (noting that Marsh did not "mention the then-dominant three-part
doctrinal test of Lemon v. Kurtzman").

39.
40.
41.

Caldor, 472 U.S. at 709 (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 708-09 (emphasis added).
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Garden sees Thornton v. Caldor as driven primarily by concerns for the
employers.4 2 She rightly points out that the Connecticut statute itself did not
injure employees. Any injury employees might suffer would have come
about as a result of the employer's choices about how to comply with the
statute. And employers had ways of accommodating Sabbatarians that
would not have burdened other employees. Garden notes that businesses
like Caldor could have "adjusted their opening hours or hired more
employees"-or perhaps most obviously-simply paid higher wages for
Sunday work. 4 3 Remember this is exactly what Caldor had to do for its union
employees-union employees had negotiated the right not to have to work
on Sunday, and to be paid premium wages if they did so voluntarily. But the
union had bargaining power, of course, and Thornton did not.
This puts Thornton v. Caldorin an unflattering light. Businesses here get
themselves out of a legal mandate requiring them to accommodate their
workers merely by pointing out they have discovered socially
counterproductive ways to comply with it. This is hostage taking, pure and
simple: "Don't make us accommodate our religious workers. Because if you
do, we've found ways we can take it out on innocent third parties." 4 And
this argument worked! To be fair, maybe it should work. It certainly matters
if other employees would be significantly burdened. But the Court in
Thornton v. Caldor takes the employer's claim at face value and does not
interrogate it.
Thornton v. Caldor thus involves complicated relationships between
employees, employers, and the government. This brings us to Lochner v.
New York. 4 5 Analogies to Lochner are common these days, and soietimes
they are overdone. Often when people compare a case to Lochner, they
intend it simply as a slam-as a way of insulting an opinion or its author, as
a way of saying that the Court was simply making it up. That is not what I
mean.
What then does Lochner have to do with this? Like Lochner, Caldor
strikes down a democratically-enacted statute protecting employees against
their employers. But the analogy goes deeper than that. Like Lochner,
Caldor seems to conceive of the market power that employers happen to
possess as natural and not state-created, so state measures empowering
42.

See Charlotte Garden, Religious Accommodation at Work: Lessons from Labor Law, 50

CoNN. L. REV. 855, 869-70 (2018) (noting that while "the Court mentions both employers and
nonadherent employees, seemingly expressing concern about the statute's effect on both groups....
closer inspection reveals that the Court's primary concern was the statute's infringement on employers'
managerial prerogatives").

43.

Id.

See id. at 870 ("[This] brings to mind an autocratic employer that adjusts to life under the
44.
statute by forcing unwilling (but nonreligious) employees to work on their coworkers' Sabbaths instead
of taking any of the other available paths.").

45.

198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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employees become interventions in the natural order that deserve suspicion
or at least strong justification. In Lochner, New York tries to protect the
health needs of its employees, only to be told by the Court that it is just not
the state's place to interfere with market relationships. 4 6 In Caldor,
Connecticut tries to protect the religious needs of its employees, only to be
told the same thing.
To be sure, Caldor itself does not say this. But one sees such ideas both
in the briefs as well as in the doctrine and subsequent cases that Caldor
generates. Free exercise, the argument goes, is a right only against the state.
Other kinds of religious burdens, such as those imposed on employees by
employers, are irrelevant. Caldor's brief says this directly: "The principle
of 'accommodation' . . . -a

principle that seeks to avoid a state-created

conflict between affirmative government action and an individual's
religious liberty-is simply not present in the instant case .

. .

. [T]he Free

Exercise Clause does not grant rights against private parties and is not
involved in this case .... " 4 7 The government, in other words, simply has no
role in trying to make employers respect the religious liberty of their
employees.
If one doubts the idea that Caldor stands for such a striking proposition,
consider the doctrine it has generated. Take this line from the Court's 2005
decision in Cutter v. Wilkinson: "Foremost, we find RLUIPA's
institutionalized-persons provision compatible with the Establishment
Clause because it alleviates exceptional government-created burdens on
private religious exercise."48 In some ways, this sentence is unremarkable.
Justice Ginsburg was writing for a unanimous Court in an easy case. This
sentence is not the heart of the legal analysis; earlier opinions had, in fact,
said basically the same thing.49 But note the sentence's implications. For
46.
Lochner, 198 U.S. at 64.
47.
Brief for Caldor, Inc. at 27, Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985) (No. 831158), 1984 WL 566033, at *27. Even more striking is an amicus brief:
[The] repeal [of Connecticut's Sunday-Closing Law] simply left the private sector free of a
state-imposed limitation. That freedom is not the equivalent of an affirmative state law that
itself has a negative impact on religion-the laws that have generated this Court's
accommodation decisions. That being so, this is not a situation in which government action
having an adverse effect on religion needs to be ameliorated by exempting religion from the
government-imposed burden. The accommodation challenged here was not a second-level
decision rendered necessary by a law enacted for secular purposes. Here, Connecticut reached
out-into a field in which the State was not otherwise involved-for the sole purpose of placing
the weight of the State behind facilitating religious exercise.
Brief of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations as Amicus Curiae

in Support of Respondent at 7-8, Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (No. 83-1158), 1984 WL 566042, at *7-8
(emphasis omitted).

48.

Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005).

49.
Take Texas Monthly, where the Court said that a religious exemption was constitutionally
suspect when it "either burdens nonbeneficiaries markedly or cannot reasonably be seen as removing a
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religious exemptions to be constitutionally legitimate, not only must the

religious burdens in question be exceptional, they must also be governmentcreated. If one takes this seriously, it suggests the unconstitutionality of any
governmental interference in market relationships in support of free
exercise. Title VII's requirement that employers make reasonable
accommodation for their employees' religious needs, for example, would
be vulnerable.50 This is not the case, of course. The Court is not about to
invalidate the religious-accommodation provisions of Title VII.51 But the
errors in this line of thinking go back to Caldor.
This brings us to the biggest thing missing from the Court's opinion. The
Court leaves out any discussion of the religious needs that prompted
Connecticut's statute in the first place. If you ever talk to an observant
Sabbatarian, it quickly becomes clear how profoundly their lives are shaped
by that religious commitment-how they are cut off from many ordinary
things that other people take for granted. When people work five days a
week, everything else naturally gets shoved off to the weekends.
Sabbatarians find themselves closed off from all those other things. A child
that observes Saturday as her Sabbath, for example, is going to have an
impossible time doing sports, theater, or countless other school activities.
2
This is why all those Jewish groups offered to represent Thomton.5 But
about the religious needs of Sabbatarians, the Court says exactly nothing.
The Court also says nothing about the power of corporations. In our
modem world, corporations wield real power-power over politics, power
over consumers, and especially power over workers. Commercial
businesses want to operate seven days a week. Lacking the economic power
to force concessions, employees have to comply. This threatens religious
liberty, but it also threatens religious equality. "Sabbatarians can never
achieve equality of employment opportunity," Americans United told the
Court, "so long as employers and unions are permitted to exclude from
employment those who cannot, because of conscience, work on their
Sabbath."53
significant state-imposed deterrent to the free exercise of religion." Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489

U.S. 1, 15 (1989) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).

Caldor's brief, in fact, openly cast doubt on it: "The truly important unanswered question in
50.
the law of religious accommodation concerns the constitutionality of 'reasonable accommodation'

statutes like Title VII ..... Brief for Caldor, Inc. at 49, Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (No. 83-1158), 1984 WL
566033, at *49.

Indeed, four Justices recently issued calls to strengthen them, floating the idea that the Court
51.
might reconsider its decision in Trans WorldAirlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977), which read

them narrowly. See Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 139 S. Ct. 634, 637 (2019) (Alito, J., joined by

three other Justices, respecting the denial of certiorari).
See supra note 27 and accompanying text (explaining this point).
52.
See Brief of Americans United for Separation of Church and State as Amicus Curiae and
53.

Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief at 7, Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (No. 83-1158), 1984 WL
566044, at *7.
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One striking thing is how this was exactly the way the United States
Supreme Court conceived of the issue before Caldor. The leading Free
Exercise case of the era, Sherbertv. Verner, involved someone else who lost
their job because they refused to work on their Sabbath.54 Sherbert held that
such folks had a constitutional right to generally available unemployment
benefits, and Sherbert saw the issue as a simple question of equality-it
was, Justice Brennan said, "nothing more than the governmental obligation
of neutrality in the face of religious differences."5 5
This is how Caldorcould so swiftly conclude that the Connecticut statute
violated the Establishment Clause. Religious exemptions fit notions of
religious neutrality, we think, because they advance religious liberty rather
than merely advancing religion simpliciter. So by leaving out any discussion
of how the Connecticut statute advances religious liberty, the only
conclusion left is that the statute advances religion. The legal analysis
becomes both formalistic and mechanistic-the kind of thing that could fit
on a single page (which, of course, it does).
It is not clear why the Court gives such short shrift to the free exercise
rationales in the case. The Court obviously thinks Connecticut's statute goes
too far; that is one thing most clearly visible from the face of the opinion.
The obvious contrast here is with Title VII's reasonable-accommodation
provision. Though it is not mentioned in the majority opinion, that provision
shows up in the briefs, oral argument, and concurring opinion. 7 Title VII is
the foil to Connecticut's statute. Title VII requires religious
accommodation, but the right is defeasible-accommodation is only
required when reasonable. Keeping Title VII constantly in mind is how to
make sense of the Court's complaints that the Connecticut statute is
"absolute and unqualified," or that "the statute takes no account of the
[needs] of the employer or . .. other employees." 59 Title VII is fine, but
Connecticut's statute goes too far.
But why does it go too far? The Court does not say, and the opinion
comes off as intuitional and impressionistic. Here Caldor is reminiscent of
the Court's case in Lynch v. Donnelly6 0-another Burger opinion from just
the year before. 6 1 Lynch had upheld a government-sponsored creche,
54.
55.

374 U.S. 398 (1963).
Id. at 409.

56.

See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text (discussing this point).

57.
See, e.g., Brief for Caldor, Inc. at 10, Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (No. 83-1158), 1984 WL 566033,
at * 10; Oral Argument at 3:59, Caldor,472 U.S. 703 (No. 83-1158), https://www.oyez.org/cases/1 984/8
3-1158; 472 U.S. at 711-12 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
58.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2018).
59.
Caldor, 472 U.S. at 709.
60.
465 U.S. 668 (1984).
61.
The influence of Chief Justice Burger on the Religion Clauses in this era must be taken
seriously. From the beginning of the 1980s to when he leaves the Court, Chief Justice Burger ends up
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concluding that the creche did not advance religion because it was secular
(or least mostly secular). This conclusion was reached breezily, as if Chief
Justice Burger could not see how anyone could disagree. Caldor has the
same feel. Chief Justice Burger says this statute advances religion. The
reasons are too obvious to explain.

Thornton v. Caldor looks different thirty-five years later. The main
opinion lacks the analytical detail and clarity modem readers expect in
Supreme Court opinions. Much in Thornton v. Caldor is undoubtedly right,
but there are also reasons to treat the case warily and with caution. Thornton
v. Caldortakes a lot of things for granted. We should not take those things
for granted; we should not take Thornton v. Caldor for granted either.

writing many of the Supreme Court's most important opinions involving the Religion Clauses-he
writes the majority opinion, for example, in Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981), Larkin v.

Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982), United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982), Bob Jones
University v. UnitedStates, 461 U.S. 574 (1983), Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), Lynch, 465
U.S. 668, Caldor, 472 U.S. 703, and Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986).

